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ECONOMICS AND ETHICS: THE CHALLENGE OF
THE BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER ON THE
ECONOMY
CHARLES K. WILBER*
The bishops' pastoral letter on "Catholic Social Teach-
ing and the U.S. Economy" is fundamentally a moral docu-
ment. It is not a treatise on economics. It was concern for the
effects of the U.S. economy on the lives of millions of human
beings that led to the issuance of the pastoral letter. The let-
ter argues that concern for human dignity in social solidarity
is at the core of Christian faith. Economic institutions and
policies have a major impact on human dignity and thus are
not only technical issues but moral concerns as well. There-
fore, the bishops argue that every perspective on economic
life that is human, moral and Christian must be shaped by
three questions: What does the economy do for people? What
does it do to people? And how do people participate in it? The
bishops further argue that in pursuing the common good, we
must pay special concern to the economy's impact on the
poor and powerless because they are particularly vulnerable
and needy.
In order to implement the principles contained in the
pastoral letter, we must develop a set of social goals against
which we can measure economic performance. The claim
that economic analysis can provide a scientific, value-free
means of evaluating the performance of economic institutions
and policies, thus obviating the need for social goals, misun-
derstands the nature of economics. Despite its claim to be
value-free, economic theory contains within its very structure
a vision of the good society based on the attainment of indi-
vidual goals. That is, economic theory embodies an individu-
alist, philosophic position that both damages its credibility as
a science and frequently places it in opposition to the very
idea of social goals. This analysis of the philosophic basis of
economic theory requires further elaboration.
* Professor of Economics, University of Notre Dame.
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I. ECONOMIC THEORY AS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
Historically, economic theory developed within an indi-
vidualist and utilitarian philosophy. Modern economics is usu-
ally dated from the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth
of Nations in 1776. This book initiated a tradition in eco-
nomic thinking which continued through John Stuart Mill in
the mid-nineteenth century and became known as the classi-
cal school in the history of economic thought.
The core of classical economic analysis is the model of
competitive market capitalism. According to classical
thought, society can depend upon an uncoerced person to act
rationally in order to maximize his or her individual self-in-
terest. More importantly, classical economists thought that an
automatic, self-regulating mechanism, if built on basic human
nature, could manage economic affairs. Free individual
choices were expected to overcome scarcity and result in the
common good through the automatic adjustments of free ex-
change in markets. The forces of competition ensured that
the economy produced those goods which people desired
and, in addition, that maximum output was produced at a
given cost or that cost was minimized for a given output. The
"invisible hand" of competition governed these results.
Thus, since the days of Adam Smith, mainstream econo-
mists have argued that the best way to overcome scarcity and
to maximize personal freedom is to rely on the individual's
pursuit of self-interest in a private property system regulated
by the force of market competition, where the government
simply acts as the neutral umpire of the rules of the economic
game. Each person would have to produce something (prod-
uct, service or labor) which others wanted and for which
others were willing to pay, in order to maximize his or her
income. This system would also maximize overall production.
But what prevents a system of private property based on
self-interest from degenerating into a jungle, where the pow-
erful oppress the weak? According to economists, competi-
tion is the great regulator of economic life. The forces of
competition ensure that the economy produces those goods
which people desire in the quantities they want.
As each individual attempts to maximize income and be-
come wealthy, society benefits, because society is the sum of
the individuals living in it. Thus, private profit and public
welfare become reconciled through the automatic and imper-
sonal forces of competition.
The widespread poverty, unemployment, and low wages
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which characterized all economies posed a problem to the
classical economists. The claim that unfettered competition
would overcome scarcity seemed to ring hollow. Classical the-
ory explained the failure in two ways. First, certain countries
restricted the free operation of markets. If those countries
removed the restrictions on the free play of self-interest,
much of the poverty would be eliminated by the resulting ec-
onomic growth. Second, in those countries that had free mar-
ket systems, continuing poverty was explained as the result of
the niggardliness of physical nature and the improvidence of
human nature. The first theory was enshrined as the law of
diminishing returns and the second as the law of population.
One hundred years after Adam Smith, Leon Walras, the
inventor of general equilibrium analysis and a key figure in
neo-classical economics, developed a mathematical demon-
stration that in the long period (a conceptual time period de-
fined as the time required for all production inputs to be per-
fectly variable), a free market system would attain Adam
Smith's optimal welfare equilibrium.' The assumptions and
conditions necessary for this "ideal state" were so restrictive
that the theory was considered of little practical significance.
However, as we will see, this theory has played a major role
in shaping the vision of economists in the mid-twentieth
century.
The final result of this history was not only a particular
economics, but also a particular social philosophy. It can be
termed the "free enterprise" or "laissez-faire" tradition
within economics. This was the dominant view of economics
in both England and the United States until the 1930's and,
after a forty year eclipse, it has once again become the domi-
nant position in economics. The following propositions sum-
marize this view:
1. People are motivated primarily by self-interest,
described best by Adam Smith as an "innate pro-
pensity to truck, barter, and exchange."'
2. A free market economy, through the forces of
competition, converts self-interested behavior into
the common good by forcing firms to produce, in
the most efficient way, those goods which consum-
ers demand.
1. L. WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS (1954).
2. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 13 (E. Cannan ed. 1937) (1st ed. London 1776).
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3. A free market economy requires freedom of
choice-of where to invest, of what job to take, of
what product to purchase, and so on.
4. Problems in the economy, including poverty, are
either due to governmental interference with the
free market or are the result of physical and
human nature. The scarcity in physical nature re-
quires time to overcome. The perveristy of human
nature means some people will always fail and
thus be poor; some people are lazy, immoral, or
improvident.
5. Public authorities can and should do little besides
enforce the rules of the game and provide those
goods-i.e., defense-that the private sector is
unable to produce.
6. The market economy is inherently stable, and
since supply will create its own demand, that equi-
librium will generally be at a position of full
employment.
In the free competition/laissez-faire view of the econ-
omy, the technical and analytical become intermingled with
personal interests and underlying world views on society.
Thus, this tradition is also at least partly a social philosophy.
As a social philosophy or ideology, the laissez-faire economic
theory that is dominant in the industrialized West serves two
essential and related functions. It restricts the scope of "sci-
entific" inquiry, and it serves as a policy stance to mold soci-
ety in its image, while lending legitimacy to certain aspects of
the status quo.
Laissez-faire theory focuses attention on the niggardli-
ness of physical nature and the improvidence of human na-
ture when it considers the causes of our failure to overcome
scarcity. Universally applicable hypotheses are devised which
transcend institutional, systemic, and historical variations.
The theory focuses potential economic research upon the be-
havior of individuals and households and constrains attention
to that behavior. Thus, people are poor because they make
the wrong decisions on questions such as family size, or be-
cause they lack the necessary ambition, or because they sim-
ply have bad luck in their choices. This theory provides a uni-
versal explanation for poverty which exonerates particular
economic institutions from blame.
Concentration on the actions of atomistic actors
camouflages the existence and exercise of power in an eco-
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nomic system and the fact that poverty is perpetuated if not
created by social institutions that benefit certain social classes
at the expense of others. Ultimately, the laissez-faire theory
becomes a conservative defense of the status quo. Poverty,
caused by the improvidence of human nature, can be reduced
only by educating people to overcome their natural indo-
lence. Changing economic structures will not make any dif-
ference, except to the extent that existing social institutions
misdirect the decision-making ability of rational individuals.
The individualist/rationalist tradition of the West, with its
emphasis on achievement and attribution of responsibility to
individuals, lends credence to free market views.
The discipline of economics developed primarily in the
individualist societies of England and the United States. Ex-
plaining poverty by an appeal to human nature fit very well
with the values of an individualist, achievement-oriented cul-
ture. Hard work, thrift, and prudence have always been seen
as the keys to success, while failure has been attributed to a
lack of these values. We have ignored systemic causes of the
failure to ensure life-sustenance to all, and instead, we blame
personal characteristics.
This theory of a free market economy dominated the
thought of economists and policymakers until the 1930's. In
the 1980's, the free market theory has been resurrected.
What caused the eclipse of laissez-faire for fifty years? Cer-
tainly, a major factor was the Depression, which belied the
claims of that social philosophy as to both the causes of pov-
erty and the claims of full-employment stability. Further, lais-
sez-faire theory could not adequately explain three major
problems in the real world economy: monopoly, externalities,
and unequal opportunity.
The market economy, as it actually developed, turned
out to have an Achilles' Heel: competition tended to destroy
itself. Competition turned out to be a footrace with the win-
ner getting larger and larger and the losers dropping out of
the race. Thus, the U.S. economy became characterized by
both largeness and a high concentration of firms in each in-
dustry. As a result, competition in advertising and product
differentiation replaced price competition. To the classical
economists, competition was the key force ensuring that the
market economy was efficient. Thus, the decline of price
competition dealt a severe blow to the credibility of laissez-
faire theory and led to calls for.government intervention to
restore competition through antitrust and pro-competitive
policies.
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Laissez-faire theory also failed to deal with a second
problem in the free market: externalities. An externality is a
cost or benefit not included in the market price. For exam-
ple, it costs a firm $3000 to produce an auto. With a $1000
markup, the sales price is $4000. However, in producing the
auto, the firm dumps waste in the local river that will cost
$500 to clean up. This $500 is a cost to those who use the
river for swimming, fishing, or other activities. As industriali-
zation and density of population increased during the growth
of the United States, so did externalities. Thus, again, many
called for the government to intervene in order to correct
the market failures and to account for these external costs.
Economists also realized that some degree of equality of
opportunity was necessary in order for a free market to be
efficient and to allow self-esteem and real freedom. Inequali-
ties in income, power, and wealth made claims to equality of
opportunity highly dubious. While a high degree of freedom
of choice ostensibly existed, it existed only for those in the
upper levels of society. Someone without skills or a stable job
had few decent choices: to eat a little more or to buy a few
more clothes, to continue in a dead-end job or to try to get
some type of dole, to vote for someone who would neglect his
or her interests or to abstain. And, of course, the poor fam-
ily's child had little equality of opportunity as compared with
the wealthy family's child. Again, this realization led to calls
for public policies that would better equalize economic
opportunities.
The most serious problem that plagued the free market
economy was recurrence of massive unemployment. To
worry over the efficiency of resource allocation in the face of
large-scale and prolonged unemployment seemed as impor-
tant as rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. When the
U.S. unemployment rate hit twenty-five percent in 1933,
economists and policymakers were ripe for a new vision and a
new social philosophy. In the public's eye, the fundamental
problem was that after 150 years of economic growth under
a free-market economy, two-thirds of the population were
still ill-housed and ill-fed. The easy assumption about the lim-
ited, individual causes of poverty rang hollow as millions of
hard working persons suddenly found their life-sustenance se-
verely threatened.
The New Deal/Keynesian economic consensus that
emerged in the 1930's provided a theory and program to
save the market economy. The consensus sought government
intervention to correct the first of the free market's four
[Vol. 2
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failures-unemployment. 3
During the 1930's, glaring inequalities of income and
wealth, widespread mortgage foreclosures, the absurdity of
idle men and idle machines in the face of obvious need, and
the failure of the state to take responsibility for alleviating
this massive suffering nearly rended the very fabric of soci-
ety. New Deal politics and Keynesian economics rescued capi-
talist democracy by providing a new mainstream consensus.
Potentially disruptive conflicts, such as massive income and
wealth redistribution programs or major changes in the pri-
vate ownership of productive property, were sidetracked by
policies designed to provide minimum economic security
through old age benefits, unemployment insurance, mini-
mum wage laws, and guarantees of the right to organize.
World War II provided the fiscal stimulus needed to restore
full-employment, and the Employment Act of 1946" gave the
federal government the right and responsibility to utilize
macrostabilization policies.
By the 1950's, policy makers concluded that, in addition
to these economic security and full-employment policies,
rapid economic growth was necessary to maintain full-em-
ployment and to avoid conflicts over allocation decisions. The
emphasis on economic growth required that the post-World
War II economy build upon an ever expanding per capita
consumption level. Thus, the first "high mass-consumption"
society was born.
In this consumer society, government was called upon to
play an even more active role. To make this ever expanding
consumption possible and to pacify the poor by ensuring that
they participated, at least marginally, in the American cornu-
copia, both the macro-management functions of government
and measures of economic security had to expand
dramatically.
The "golden age" of American capitalist democracy was
1961-1967. Per capita income and consumption expanded
dramatically; Keynesian economics seemed to meet its test,
because the economy achieved full employment and stable
prices. In the euphoria of the moment, "fine-tuning" was ex-
pected to banish forever the twin evils of inflation and unem-
3. The other three failures of the unfettered market system have
been dealt with-however inadequately-piecemeal during the past forty
years.
4. Pub. L. No. 79-304, 60 Stat. 23 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1021-1026 (1982)).
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ployment. In addition to successful macro-management, the
period witnessed the launching of the Peace Corps and the
War on Poverty. It was the era of the New Frontier and the
Great Society. The Achilles' Heel of democratic capital-
ism-unemployment-was finally conquered, and only the
faint-hearted glanced anxiously at the first rumblings of
inflation.
But cracks began to appear in 1965, spreading through
1968, changing directions in 1969-70, resulting in 1973-75 in
the longest and deepest recession/depression since the 1930's
and culminating in seemingly endless stagflation. First came
the war in Vietnam, then the revolt of the young, followed by
inflation, pollution, food and oil shortages, and recession.
Economists began to talk about a wide variety of new institu-
tional developments that somehow seemed to have an omi-
nous role in all these crises-the rise of multinational corpo-
rations with their transfer pricing and cross-subsidization; the
development of foreign multinational firms as competitors;
the coincidence of the business cycles of the United States,
Japan and the Western European capitalist countries; OPEC,
the oil cartel; and the apparent impotence of government.
And, as if this was not enough, the simultaneous appearance
of massive unemployment and double-digit infla-
tion-stagflation -- shattered the Keynesian consensus.
As a result of this stagflation crisis, the American electo-
rate opted to embrace the old-time religion of unfettered
free enterprise under the guise of supply-side economics.
This choice was preferred to President Carter's slightly more
liberal version, masquerading as the descendant of the New
Deal/Keynesian consensus that had dominanted the previous
forty years.
Government programs established under the New Deal/
Keynesian consensus were attacked because they reduced in-
centives and thus productivity. Free up the economy and all
would be well. Reduce welfare, minimum wages, and unem-
ployment benefits so that the poor would have greater incen-
tive to work. Lower taxes, and remove regulations on busi-
ness so that the resulting higher profits would encourage
corporations and wealthy individuals to save and invest. In-
creased productivity and a growth in GNP would result.
Eventually, the benefits would trickle down so that even those
on the bottom would be better off than before.
Unfortunately this is more ideology than fact. The resur-
rection of free market economics has substantially reduced
inflation but at the cost of a massive recession during 1981-
[Vol. 2114
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82, continued high unemployment, increased poverty, accel-
erated decline of the old industrial base, and record budget
and balance-of-payments deficits.
We have made the economy our master instead of using
it as our servant. We close industrial plants, create unemploy-
ment, and devastate whole communities and call it an effi-
cient reallocation of resources. We, who are prospering from
free market policies, caution that nothing can be done be-
cause natural economic forces are at work. The poor, the un-
employed and the under-employed bear the burden of this
individualist free market myopia.
In both economic theory and economic policy-making,
the implicit goal is clear: individual freedom to pursue self-
interest. The supposed icing on the cake is that the greatest
good for the greatest number will result. The role of govern-
ment is to facilitate the workings of this system. For the con-
servative, that means doing little-enforcing contracts, fi-
nancing a defense, and erecting certain public works. For the
liberal, it means attempting to correct at least some of the
largest market failures-unemployment, unequal opportu-
nity, environmental destruction.
In the most fundamental sense, free market theory im-
plies that there are no social goals, only individual goals. Soci-
ety is seen as merely an aggregation of individuals. Milton
Friedman, in his usual trenchant manner, provided a short
summary of the free market position:
The central planners want planning by them for us. They
want the government-by which they really mean them-
selves-to decide "social priorities" (i.e., tell us what is
good for us); "rationalize production" (i.e., tell us where
and how we should work); assure "equitable distribution"
(i.e., take from some of us to give to others of us).. . . Such
planning, from the top down, is inefficient because it makes
it impossible to use the detailed knowledge shared among
millions of individuals. It undermines freedom because it
requires people to obey orders rather than pursue their
own interests.
I am for planning, too, but planning by each of us sepa-
rately in light of our individual, though shared, values, co-
ordinated by voluntary exchange in free markets. Such
planning, from the bottom up, enlists the interests of each
in promoting the well-being of all. Government has its
role-to provide a stable legal and monetary framework,
enforce contracts and adjudicate disputes and protect us
19851
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from coercion by our fellow citizens.5
Adam Smith could not have said it better. Two hundred
years of change in the economic world are irrelevant to eco-
nomic theory. Free market theory envisions no Rockefellers,
no multinational corporations, no imperialism, no environ-
mental destruction; just many small buyers and sellers engag-
ing in production and exchange, and thus maximizing their
freedom and economic welfare. If we could only get govern-
ment to tend to its proper business, all would be well. This
vision of the world may be beautiful, but it is a vision, and a
vision which is completely at odds with both the realities that
constrain us and with the tradition of Catholic social thought.
II. THE CATHOLIC TRADITION AND SOCIAL GOALS: TOWARD A
NEW SOCIAL CONSENSUS
Catholic tradition sees society as more dense and com-
plex than a simple aggregation of individuals. Society is com-
posed of individuals and groups (families, neighborhoods,
parishes, ethnic groups, associations and governmental units),
and is characterized by interdependencies among these individ-
uals and groups. This interdependence makes sole reliance
on individual goals inadequate. The difference in power
among individuals and groups, and thus differences in the de-
gree of interdependence, means that total reliance on the
free market will lead to unjust outcomes.
There is no escape, therefore, from enumerating social
goals with which to evaluate economic institutions and poli-
cies. To do so, we must create a new social consensus. This
creation can take place only within a moral context, one in
which the too-easy separation of moral values and economic
behavior is realized for what it is-impossible and destruc-
tive. A key starting point is a moral stance consistent with our
underlying value structure, but which can guide us in making
economic decisions, both individually and as a society.
The Catholic bishops have tried to provide this moral
stance for us. They have entered the public debate by insist-
ing that economic issues are moral issues. They have drawn
upon the richness of Catholic tradition to provide moral prin-
ciples for guidance.
As an economist, I take the bishops' challenge seriously.
The following is my attempt to translate that challenge into a
5. Friedman, National Economic Planning, NEWSWEEK, July 14,
1975, at 71.
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framework for economic policy. Of necessity, it is brief. It
begins with a specification of social goals followed by a pres-
entation of those moral values that can provide the basis for a
new social consensus.
A. Social Goals
Following the work of Denis Goulet,6 there are three
specific goals for an economy. The first is "life-sustenance,"
which corresponds generally to physiological needs. Thus,
every society strives to provide its citizens with the basic
goods that are necessary for life-adequate food, water,
housing, clothing, education, and health care; a successful
economy will be one which can provide these necessities. The
satisfaction of this goal is directly linked with overall eco-
nomic performance. Unemployment will affect the ability of
those without jobs to satisfy their need for life-sustenance; in-
flation can erode the purchasing power of portions of the
population; and growth may be necessary to provide life-sus-
taining jobs. Instability in the economy and the economic cy-
cle can also affect life-sustenance.
But we must also ask how to specify life-sustenance. One
method is to differentiate among three types of goods. The
first are necessities, such as food and water. Within some lim-
its, the needs of people in this realm can be specified. The
second type of goods are "enhancement goods," those which
make life more vital, more interesting, more worth living. Ex-
amples might be music, religious institutions, various forms
of entertainment, some household goods, and so on. The
third level of goods involves what are commonly known as
luxury goods. Driving a Cadillac instead of a Chevrolet, buy-
ing a marble-topped table instead of a wooden one, and walk-
ing on a llama rug instead of a polyester one, are all instances
of consuming luxury goods. So, to what level of goods do we
refer to when we talk of life-sustenance?
That is a difficult question. We can all agree that basic
needs must be met. Most believe that enhancement goods are
worthy of pursuit. Less accord exists on luxury goods. Tradi-
tional economics in the United States has claimed that indi-
vidual wants are unlimited and that luxury goods satisfy
wants, as do basic goods. If individuals want Cadillacs and
llama rugs, and if the economy can produce such luxuries, it
6. D. GOULET, THE CRUEL CHOICE: A NEW CONCEPT IN THE THEORY
OF DEVELOPMENT 236-49 (1977).
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ought to produce them. Some voices dispute this view.
A second component of societal goals found in most soci-
eties is esteem and fellowship. An economic system should
provide a sense of worth and dignity to its citizens. One's
goods can be a measure of societal esteem. But there is more.
The institutions in which citizens work should support them
physically and give them a sense of belonging and contribut-
ing to an important undertaking. Society should have clubs,
churches, or other entities which support the individual. If
the family is the basic social and economic unit, as is the case
in the United States, the economy should support this unit
and lend to families a sense of self-esteem that can sustain
them. Another term for this support is fellowship-the econ-
omy should promote right relations among its participants,
and, to the extent that it can, the economy should keep life
from being "nasty and brutish," while providing life-suste-
nance to lengthen it.
No society can function smoothly, without disruptive ten-
sions, if there is no fellowship among its members. If people
are alienated from one another and if society is fractured
into myriad self-interested and self-centered individuals or
groups, society will not survive. If no genuine concern exits
for one's neighbors and if empathy for others disappears,
then each small self-sufficing entity (whether this be family,
occupational group, or individual) will eventually withdraw
into itself and live at odds with others. No social system can
prevail which endorses or engenders such self-centeredness.
If material economic well-being is at the heart of social suc-
cess, then surely fellowship is the lifeblood that sustains the
community. Fellowship is the cohesion in a society that makes
one individual feel a closeness and a unity of purpose with all
others in that society, whether personally known or not. Con-
sequently, besides providing for the material needs of its
members, an economic system must also encourage the
growth of widely shared esteem that yields a life-giving and
life-sustaining fellowship.
This goal of shared esteem implies an element of equity
among the citizens. A society which gives minimal income to
most of the population, and fabulous wealth to one or few
families, cannot provide esteem or fellowship. Equity, of
course, does not necessarily mean equality, but it does mean
that there be some consensus regarding the justness of the
distribution of wealth and income.
The third goal of the economy is freedom. Freedom
played a major role in our own history as an important com-
[Vol. 2
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ponent of the drive for independence from England, yet it is
still a difficult goal to specify clearly. Freedom obviously does
not mean that every individual must have complete freedom
to do whatever that person wishes, for that would be anarchy
and the death of society. At its weakest, an increase in free-
dom means that the range of options open to the individual
or the group has increased-that there are more choices
available. This has its physical side in choice of goods, but it
can also operate in other spheres, such as the political or
religious.
The goal of freedom contains three component parts.
The first, which is usually the one at the center of much eco-
nomic theorizing in the United States, is consumer sover-
eignty. As noted above, consumer sovereignty means that in-
dividuals should be able to choose the goods that they wish to
consume.
The second part of freedom is worker sovereignty. Peo-
ple must have a choice of jobs that they find meaningful and
which enhance their human capacities. Some mechanism
must find people's preferences for work, add up those prefer-
ences, and generate the types of jobs required. A variety of
mechanisms could satisfy this need: labor mobility among
jobs of widely different characters, control by workers over
their job situations, or provision of capital resources to labor-
ers to allow them to establish their own undertakings.
Whatever the mechanism, this characteristic is important be-
cause work plays a vital part in human development.
Citizen sovereignty, a mechanism to aggregate people's
preferences for community, is the third component of the
freedom goal. What will be the community with which an in-
dividual interacts? What kind of community do people want?
What kind of environment do they want? The concept of citi-
zen sovereignty implies that society provides the citizen with
a way to express preferences and to control communities.
Several mechanisms could satisfy this requirement; these
mechanisms may be quite different from our usual image of
democracy based on voting procedures in the United States.
Citizen sovereignty could be enhanced through the forma-
tion of local groups for citizen participation in decision-mak-
ing, such as block committees in urban areas and coopera-
tives in rural areas. Or perhaps local residents might
participate in the operation of local industries in their areas
in order to minimize the negative aspects of industrial pro-
duction, such as noise and pollution.
These three social goals-life-sustenance, esteem and fel-
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lowship, and freedom-embody the core of Catholic social
thought and express much of what is best in the American
experience. Acceptance of these goals will require the crea-
tion of a new social consensus to replace both the reigning
free market philosophy and the presently discredited New
Deal/Keynesian consensus.
B. The Role of Moral Values
A new social consensus on economic policy could be built
on three central moral values derived from the bishops' pas-
toral letter, which are compatible with the best in the Ameri-
can spirit and tradition: stewardship, jubilee, and subsidiarity.
These moral values relate directly to the three major eco-
nomic goals: providing for basic human needs, generating
freedom of choice, and fostering conditions for good human
relationships (fellowship).
Note the contrast with the manner in which President
Reagan's economic program was conceived and developed.
There was indeed an effort to provide a moral base, but it
was the base of the competitive individual whose self-inter-
ested behavior would be made socially beneficial by the invisi-
ble hand of free market competition. Current performance
should be evidence enough of the program's wrong-headed-
ness, at least for the less well-off. Second, the program did
not deal openly with the social contract. Instead, it has at-
tempted to enforce a redistribution of income, from the less
well-off to the more well-off, by hiding behind the rhetoric of
"supply-side economics." Any program must be open about
its distributional impact and admit that some adjustment
needs to be made in income shares. This may make the eco-
nomic program less politically salable, but it ultimately will
make the policies adopted more successful; indeed, it is the
basis for any successful confrontation with the reality of cur-
rent economic problems. In this spirit, the following is of-
fered for thought, reflection, and action.
1. Stewardship
The initial moral value which runs deeply in the Judeo-
Christian moral tradition is stewardship. A steward or trustee
conception of property differs from that which underlies the
theory of the market economy. John Locke argued that pri-
vate property was a necessary part of a good society.7 Private
7. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1960)
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property is justified by and derived from the labor of its
owner. This labor theory of property came to be one of the
crucial elements of the classical economic doctrine. Because
persons had wrested the soil from the state of nature and had
cut the trees and so on, that land should belong to them, and
they should be entitled to use it for whatever purpose they
saw fit-and so should their children and grandchildren. The
modern economy, with the dominant role played by huge
corporations, is far removed from property creation in the
sense of Locke.
In contrast to the Lockean theory of property, the stew-
ardship conception states that private individuals may own
and use property for their own interests but only as long as
their use does not result in harm to the common good. For
example, we must weigh a local community's need for em-
ployment against a firm's property right to relocate a plant to
a different community.
The specific implication of this moral canon is that soci-
ety is responsible to ensure that the resources at its disposal
are used well. More specifically, if the system of automatic
adjustment through markets cannot deal meaningfully with
the current problems, there should be no difficulty in inter-
fering to ensure that economic performance improves. I do
not suggest that an economic system should capriciously in-
terfere with property rights; however, where the evidence
shows that some interference or change is necessary to im-
prove the overall functioning of the economy, the demands
of stewardship should rule.
2. Jubilee
Good human relationships do not thrive in the context
of extreme competition, where self-esteem comes from one's
position relative to others. An alternative approach to such
hierarchial patterns is the biblical concept of jubilee, which
was the ideal if not always the reality. "Jubilee" grows out of
the institution described in Leviticus which saw every fifty
years not only as a time of ceiebration but also as a time of
restitution, remission and release. Slaves were released, and
land and houses that had been sold reverted to the original
owners or their heirs.8 In this fashion, society had a mecha-
nism which allowed inequality (competition) but also re-
(1st ed. London 1698).
8. Leviticus 25:8-55.
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dressed its detrimental tendencies in the interest of maintain-
ing social cohesion.
Our economy does not function any better because of
the substantial inequalities which we have built into it, con-
trary to what the present administration would have us be-
lieve. Are our workers' energies stimulated by the possibility
of buying $10,000 designer revolvers or $95,000 chinchilla
bedspreads that continued in popularity even during the
worst of the 1981-82 recession? Would corporate chief execu-
tives quit to the quiet of their homes if their incomes were
lower than the 1977 median of $471,000? Hardly, as they
would still be rewarded well in monetary terms and in psychic
income-pride, challenge, power, status.
A more successful approach economically, in terms of
the goal of fellowship, would be to build on an ethic of jubi-
lee. By this, I do not mean an immediate and massive redistri-
bution of income, but rather the adoption of policies that
provide, with dignity, an income guarantee and a full employ-
ment policy for all who can work. In addition, basic goods,
especially housing, should be ensured to all.
These policies would not only increase the absolute level
of income of the lower income population but would reduce
defacto the relative income differences. A jubilee ethic would
provide the motivation necessary for these policies.
3. Subsidiarity
We will find solutions to our economic problems only if
citizens are willing to cooperate in the difficult readjustments
necessary to change the economy. This cooperation requires
that policies be developed and implemented at the lowest fea-
sible levels. This embodies the principle of subsidiarity.
Only half of the eligible electorate bothered to vote in
the last U.S. elections. 9 National institutions have become too
large, too uncontrollable, too unresponsive. Yet, there has
been an incredible proliferation of neighborhood groups. We
must develop smaller institutions more responsive to individ-
ual needs.
United States society today is characterized by largeness
of firms and government institutions. Exxon, GM, and IBM
are all mega-institutions. Government agencies, such as the
Department of Defense, are even larger. Socialist economies
share this same characteristic. Their economic institutions
9. G. POMPER, THE ELECTION OF 1984, at 85 (1985).
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are even larger and more bureaucratized than ours.
The development of the U.S. economy has created a fun-
damental dichotomization of social, political, and economic
life. Put most simply, the dichotomy is between the mega-in-
stitutions and the private life of the individual. People could
cope with these mega-institutions if the dichotomization pro-
cess had not so deinstitutionalized the private life of individu-
als. People have always found their identity through and, in
turn, impressed their values on, the mega-institutions
through what Peter Berger calls "mediating structures."'"
This is where freedom is nurtured and protected, where the
counter to bureacracy lies, where moral values can play a role
in resource allocation. However, this interlocking network of
mediating institutions-family, church, voluntary association,
neighborhood, and subculture-has been severely weakened
by the growth of the mega-institutions that have taken over
many of their traditional functions.
Ways must be found to revitalize mediating institutions
from the bottom-up. A good example is Germany's effort to
give workers a direct role in decision-making. We should seri-
ously investigate these possibilities. We should also be willing
to examine new forms of organization, such as workers'
ownership.
An encouraging note in a generally grim picture is the
growth of not-for-profit organizations. In many cases-credit
unions, employee stock ownership plans, neighborhood as-
sociations-these have been grass-roots responses to the di-
chotomization of modern life. Thus, an important part of ec-
onomic policy must be the fostering of not-for-profit
organizations. In general, public policy should (1) do nothing
to further harm these mediating institutions, and (2) try to
use these institutions to implement policy.
III. A SUMMING UP
The road ahead is not easy, and the precise directions of
change are still ambiguous. One thing is clear: the choices
made at the national level cannot be relied upon alone as the
most effective manner of working toward revitalization of the
U.S. economy. These choices will simply create more mega-
institutions.
A national/regional/local planning system will be neces-
10. Berger, In Praise of Particularity: The Concept'of Mediating Struc-
tures, 38 REV. POL. 399 (1976).
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sary to ensure full-employment, stable prices, and the imple-
mentation of social policy. An economic system which guar-
antees jobs will require an increased level of democracy in
order to function effectively. When workers are freed of the
fear of losing their jobs, our system will need democratic co-
operation to replace fear as the motive for working.
A careful balance must be maintained between the cen-
tral economic planning necessary to control the corporate
sector for the common good and the decentralization neces-
sary to make worker self-management, local government, and
mediating institutions foster freedom of choice and
fellowship.
The needed economic changes have no chance of success
without the development of a new social consensus. That so-
cial consensus, in turn, requires the reconstruction of the
moral base of our economy. To this end, moralists must help
economists and politicians articulate the necessary values and
goals. The bishops have taken the first step. I hope many
others follow.
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